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Abstract
This article investigates the factors that lead to a sustainable management of protected forest 
by analysing the joint-management policy implemented by forestry authorities through a 
bio-economic model. A dynamic optimisation technique in continuous time has been used 
to derive results that explore the policy responses that may stimulate forest conservation. 
The study shows that joint management improves the level of forest conservation compared 
to the state management implemented thus far. The results argue that the share of the income 
from the exploitation of secondary products going to the local community should be at least 
equal to that resulting from timber exploitation. In particular, forest preservation is better 
when that share is close to unity, since it constitutes the main incentive of anti-infiltration 
effort supplied by the local community. However, an absolute increase in the marginal 
revenue of this secondary activity improves the level of conservation. Finally, the study 
reveals the need for external funding to account for the public good effect of the forest.
Keywords: anti-infiltration effort, external financial support, joint forest management, 
local community, protected forest
1 Introduction
The world is confronted today with multiple threats: soil, water and marine resource 
impoverishment; air pollution; the loss of ozone layer; climate change and, in 
particular, deforestation. The latter is partly the cause of the first phenomena, since 
forests play a strategic role in the ecosystem, in particular in terms of their capacity 
to protect against watershed, the erosion of topsoil cover, the recycling of nutrients 
at the local economy level and their ability to produce benefits related to biodiversity 
and carbon sequestration at the international level. Today, environmental and 
natural resources management problems constitute the major challenges facing 
decision-makers. Indeed, the tropical forests have decreased strongly under various 
pressures. According to Lanly (1982), the annual rate of deterioration of the humid 
tropical forests rose to about 6.113 million hectares for the period 1976–1980. Recent 
data indicate that the rhythm of the world’s yearly deforestation, estimated at about 
8.868 million hectares between 1990 and 2000, is argued to reach 7.317 million 
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hectares per year between 2000 and 2005. Thus, the surface of the world’s forests 
decreased from 4.077 billion hectares in 1990, to 3.952 billion in 2005 (FAO, 2007). 
The forests of Côte d’Ivoire are following the same deforestation trend (Aké, 1984; 
N’Guessan, 2006). Indeed, shifting agriculture, logging overexploitation and wood-
energy-gathering constitute the main activities leading to deforestation in Côte 
d’Ivoire (FAO, 2003). These actions have led to a deterioration of more than 83 per 
cent of the forest surfaces. Thus, from 15 million hectares at the beginning of the last 
century, only 2.5 million hectares of forest remained in 1996 (SODEFOR, 1996) and 
even less these past years. Today, the forests not yet exploited are estimated to cover 
only the few thousands of hectares of forest reserves and national parks on which 
Côte d’Ivoire has based the conservation of its flora and fauna.
1Unfortunately, these protected areas are constantly infiltrated for agricultural 
purposes. Indeed, about 30 per cent of forest surfaces are occupied by agriculture, 
and more than 72 000 families live inside these forests (AIFORT, 2008). 
2To overcome this situation, in 1992 the Ivorian government decided to entrust 
SODEFOR (Society for Forest Development) with the management of all protected 
Ivorian forests. That public society, established in 1966, which specialises in 
industrial reforestation, is tasked with finding solutions to the presence of a 
vast agricultural population now resident in the protected forests. In this regard, 
SODEFOR implemented a joint management policy (JMP) through a discussion 
forum called the ‘Peasants–Forests Commission’. The ensuing policy aims to involve 
the local community in the management of protected forests. The expected results 
are, however, misleading, in the sense that the portion of the forest being cultivated 
for agricultural purposes, keeps increasing. 
3Due to the failures of the joint management policy, in March 1997 the government 
decided to take repressive measures. Its policy of repression allows the forestry 
authority, SODEFOR, to systematically destroy all perennial crops that are not yet in 
production, along with all food crops in protected areas. Unfortunately, infiltrations 
still continue and are threatening the ecological equilibrium of the country despite 
these promising policies.
4The objective of this article is to investigate the factors that could lead to the 
sustainable management of protected forests in Côte d’Ivoire, in the context of joint 
management. Questions include: Were JMP instruments set efficiently? Did they 
take all policy components – especially economic aspects – into account? What are 
the economic incentives of the JMP? In other words, what economic factors drive 
optimal levels of forest conservation?
5In spite of the widespread implementation of the JMP, it appears that little 
formal analysis is available on the topic. The few analyses that exist use the game 
theory approach. This article makes a significant contribution to the literature in the 
sense that it employs a bio-economic model to analyse the joint forest management 
approach, taking explicit note of the infiltration phenomenon which was non-existent 
in previous studies.
6A bio-economic model using dynamic optimisation techniques in continuous 
time has been used to deal with the problem. The main result from this study is that a 
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JMP, with the support of the international community and with the equitable sharing 
of forestry income to benefit the local community, will improve the management of 
protected forest by mitigating peasants’ encroachments.
7The article is structured as follows: The following section offers insight into 
forest management policy in Côte d’Ivoire and presents the Peasants–Forest 
Commission structure. Section 3 deals with the literature review. Section 4 outlines 
the methodology, while section 5 presents the results of the study and the final 
section concludes by formulating a number of recommendations.
2 Forest management policy in Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire has begun its economic development thanks to its forests, which provide 
favourable conditions for agriculture and timber exploitation. Unfortunately, the 
country’s forest cover is currently experiencing a very advanced level of degradation, 
which is threatening the ecological balance and therefore its economy. Indeed, the 
country’s forest cover, which amounted to almost 16 million hectares in 1900, had 
decreased to less than three million hectares in 1991 (FAO, 2001) and is estimated to 
be less than two million today. 
8Facing the serious ecological, economic and cultural consequences of human 
development, the government has taken political and institutionally important 
measures aimed at reversing the trend of forest degradation. Primary amongst these 
is the design and adoption in 1988 of the forestry management plan (1988–2015), 
with five major objectives intended to manage the country’s forests in a sustainable 
way. The Forest Management Plan (FMP) focuses on the effective participation of 
populations in forest management, in order to achieve the efficient management 
of this natural resource (MINEFOR, 1988). This arrangement was reinforced by 
forestry sector reform in July 1994 which aims to manage forests by intensifying 
controls (the creation of forestry police, litigation, stronger monitoring capabilities) 
and promoting reforestation activities at village level. 
9Despite these arrangements, gaps and challenges in promoting the sustainable 
management of forest remain. These include
• the strong pressure of the population on forest resources for various social 
needs and agricultural purposes;
• the weak adherence of the population to the principle of sustainable management 
of forest resources as well as the concept of reforestation;
• a lack of financial resources for the necessary investments.
In that regard, in 1992 the government decided to allocate all protected forests to 
SODEFOR (established in 1966), a public society whose objective is to efficiently 
manage 231 protected forests covering a total surface of 4 196 000 hectares. As 
part of its integrated management policy, SODEFOR has opted for the inclusion of 
social and agro-economic factors interfering in forest management. The JMP which 
SODEFOR designed, aims to address the problem of agriculture–forest interface in a 
consensual manner, through the creation of a discussion forum and decision-making 
by the PFC. Indeed, this commission is seen as the main tool in the rehabilitation 
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of protected forests, since it links the local population to the forest management, 
while allowing for a smooth resolution of issues around illegal settlements. The 
PFC brings together riparian peasant representatives, farmers who have settled in 
protected forests, local administrators, economic operators and SODEFOR. The 
committee, which operates according to a charter and internal rules that determine 
its constitution, has both a local and a national component.
10However, many difficulties have affected the implementation of the JMP, in 
the sense that the message conveyed through the CPF has been misunderstood by 
stakeholders (Ibo et al., 1997). As part of these difficulties, there is the problem 
of communication amongst field staff, and conflicts between the local population 
and forest officers which brought about an increase in protected forest clearings. 
In 1993, for instance, more than 30 per cent of the protected forests were cultivated 
by more than 500 000 farmers (Leonard, 1997). The average rates of infiltration 
over the periods 1991–1996 and 1996–1999 were 26 and 27 per cent respectively 
(FAO, 2001). Between 1960 and 1986, the government had released about 975 000 
ha for the benefit of agricultural activities, in order to avoid precisely such a situation 
(SODEFOR, 1992). The western and the south-western regions presented the highest 
infiltration rates – 24 and 44 per cent respectively (SODEFOR, 1994). In the same 
way, various partners in rural areas consider PFCs to be a SODEFOR tool, used by 
the organisation to oblige them to adopt its decisions.
11Overall, the joint management tools designed by SODEFOR have not been used 
efficiently by SODEFOR agents or by farmers. Indeed, those instruments have 
mostly been designed without the participation of the local population. In addition, 
the tools have not been truly tested and sufficiently disseminated. There is also an 
under-representation of local populations in the commission (1/6) (Ibo et al., op.cit.) 
which constitutes significant evidence of its failure. Finally, there have been financial 
problems, in the sense that no budget has been drawn up (Lorng, 1999). 
12Basically, this approach has real advantages aimed at addressing the problem 
of illegal settlements without leading to open conflict between the planters and the 
administration. However, its effectiveness and sustainability are related to economic 
aspects that have not been sufficiently taken into account. In this article, an attempt 
is made to fill this gap by exploring the economic incentives which local populations 
are sensitive to (King, 1965).
3 Literature review
In the literature, several approaches have been utilised to attain biodiversity 
conservation objectives (Oates, 1999; Terborgh, 1999; Schwartzman et al., 2000; 
Wilhussen et al., 2002). In this context there are, on one hand, partisans of the full 
protection of natural forests that are rich in biodiversity, and on the other hand 
partisans of an approach reconciling forest conservation with the wellbeing of the 
local population. 
13The first paradigm envisages the creation of exclusive, protected, natural zones 
where the local population is considered a threat for biodiversity conservation. 
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For defenders of this ‘forest conservation’ approach, some uninhabited natural 
protected areas would be best suited to sustainably protect natural areas. But, 
with the sustainable development concept, this paradigm of conservation has been 
considerably modified. Indeed, in reality, traditional ‘top-down’ approaches of area 
protection that aim to exclude all human presence are unsustainable (Brown, 2003), 
for multiple reasons: it is impossible to enclose the protected areas; staff only have 
weak means of effecting reserve control; frustrations arises from any exclusion of 
the local encroaching population, and so on.  
14Therefore, at the end of the 1980, a new conservation approach was proposed, 
based on the capacity-building strategy of the local population as a fundamental 
means to reach conservation objectives. Known as ‘new conservation’ or ‘people-
oriented approaches’, the rural population’s dependence on the forests contributes 
to the deterioration of natural resources. Indeed, the poorest agriculturists are 
those whose incomes and agricultural production are low, thus they depend more 
on the forests (Pascal et al., 2002). The poor are growing in number, which exerts 
increasing pressure on the natural resources and damages them (Malthus, 1980). 
Therefore, all conservation projects should aim, primarily, to improve the living 
conditions of the local population. This approach has been accepted and adopted 
by institutions in charge of conservation, by countries and by non-governmental 
organization (NGOs). 
15A first approach of this indirect method of conservation is to develop ecotourism 
in forest zones, and this has the support of financial institutions such as the World 
Bank (Nicholls, 2004). However, indirect conservation measures have been severely 
criticised. On the one hand, criticism was related to the low profits the local populations 
derive from this method. Most local communities involved in ecotourism projects 
receive a limited share of the profits earned from that activity, and rather rely on 
activities that are extremely aggressive (Oates, 1999; Nicholls, 2004). Worse still, 
indirect conservation approaches failed because of the local population’s incorrect 
perceptions of the desires and the will of forestry conservationists, the ambiguous 
effects of conservation incentives, the difficulties of implementation, and problems 
related to the achievement of the spatial and temporal aspects of conservation 
objectives (Ferraro and Simpson, 2005). 
16To contribute to the debate, this study not only aims to investigate the incentives 
for forest conservation, but also to determine their optimal levels through a rigorous 
modeling of the case of Côte d’Ivoire. In this perspective, Ferraro et al. (2002, 2005) 
propose a new concept of conservation, namely: ‘You should pay for what you want 
to get.’ In other words, if financial institutions want to reach conservation objectives 
they should pay for conservation efforts, not for activities related to conservation 
(Ferraro & Kiss, 2002). Indeed, the profits deriving from forestry services, and 
current and future option values, benefit the international community rather than 
locals (Balmford & Whitten, 2003). Therefore, the recourse to direct mechanisms 
in the form of aid to the local population for ‘conservation performances’ would 
constitute a win-win solution, because it would help attain conservation objectives 
as well as development goals (Gueneau et al., 2004).
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17Using an econometric model, Ferraro and Simpson (2005) show that in the 
case of Madagascar, for example, for the same budget allocated to conservation, 
the direct payments option would have permitted 80 per cent of tropical forests to 
be protected, against 12 to 22 per cent with indirect measures. Also, the incomes 
of the local population would have doubled thanks to direct measures. For these 
authors, biodiversity would be endangered in less developed countries, because 
the profits the local population derive from its destruction exceeds whatever they 
derive from its preservation. For them, protected areas represent a loss of income 
and an opportunity cost that is not efficiently compensated. For example, according 
to some evaluations, two national parks in Madagascar have reduced the income of 
neighbouring communities by about ten per cent (Nicholls, 2004).  
18For some authors, conserving tropical forests is an integral part of economic 
systems where the supply and demand of biodiversity are privatised (Lescuyer, 
2004). Therefore, biodiversity is considered a ‘commodity’ that can be sold or 
bought (Nicholls, op. cit.). This is known as the trade approach to conservation or 
‘market-based conservation’, where contracts between states, private firms, NGOs 
and local communities are based on market instruments.
19However, the JMP as a solution to the sustainable management of protected areas 
has been imposed in a dogmatic manner, without reference to research works based 
on the bio-economic model. A number of authors have attempted to deal with joint 
forest management issues by using the game theory approach (Angelsen, 2001; 
Caputo & Lueck, 2003; Lise, 2001; Rotillon & Tazdait, 2003; Shahi & Kant, 2007). In 
addition, improving the indirect approach to conservation through research aimed at 
understanding the complexity of local communities, highlights efficient conditions 
for a participatory process, determines which factors affect the responsibility of 
local populations, and values the impact of sustainable development actions. 
20Therefore, this study uses the bio-economic model to analyse the JMP, taking 
into account the infiltration phenomenon. Globally, the author agrees with Nicholls 
(2004) that the remittance of direct support will be well designed with strategies 
where indirect instruments (dialogue, education and other factors) are necessary 
to orient the practices of the local population toward sustainable development. 
According to this perspective, the study attempts to determine which factors will 
ensure the efficient and sustainable management of the protected forests of Côte 
d’Ivoire, based on appropriate modeling.
4 The model
4.1 JMP formalisation
A bio-economic model with two agents (local community and SODEFOR) is 
proposed, along with two activities (agriculture and forest conservation), to analyse 
the JMP using dynamic optimisation techniques in continuous time. The model is 
adapted from Fischer et al. (2011) to the context of forest management by considering 
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intraspecific interactions within the dynamic of agricultural land, along with a 
general form for profit functions. 
21SODEFOR has a fixed amount of (protected) forest to maintain and reforest. The 
local community living adjacent to the protected forest and has user rights over the 
remaining land for agricultural purposes. These two agents act within a defined 
area, but conflicts arise when farmers go into the protected forest in search of fertile 
land to cultivate. Indeed, in this article, the only strategic interaction between forest 
users is assumed to be unidirectional, in the sense that the local community (farmers) 
infiltrate protected areas as the density of the forest increases. The converse is not 
meaningful, as SODEFOR (timber harvester) cannot find timber on non-forested 
land. Thus, the forest vs. agriculture conflict in this particular setting is dependent 
on the density of the protected forest: As the density of the forest increases, the rate 
of infiltration increases. 
22Two cases can be considered in the context of profit sharing:
• - The market solution, where each agent (local community and SODEFOR) 
maximises its own profit;
• - The social solution, where social planners undertake unified resource 
management.
From these two solutions, it is possible to derive socially optimal economic measures.
4.1.1  Local community
In a joint management context where the local community is involved in managing 
the protected forest, it receives a discounted profit clπ . By implication, it receives 
remuneration (α and β ) as part of the different types of revenue generated by 
SODEFOR. These revenues are considered net of exploitation costs.1 Indeed, 
SODEFOR sells logging exploitation permits to forest harvesters and in return 
receives a net revenue 1( )tR q where 1tq represents the standing volume of wood 
contained in a given surface and sold in the year t. Suppose that ' 11 ( ) 0q ttR q > and ''
11 1
( ) 0q q tt tR q < . SODEFOR also receives net revenue 1( )tR x  from the exploitation of by-products2 such as charcoal, rafters, planks and beams, etc. Suppose that 
this income grows with the stock of the protected forest 1tx with a positive first 
derivative and a negative second derivative, i.e., 
'
11
( ) 0x ttR x > and
''
11 1
( ) 0x x tt tR x <. The local community receives net revenue 2( )tR q  from its agricultural activity 
on its own lands outside of the protected forest, with x2t the surface in agricultural 
exploitation at time t. This function is such that ' 22 ( ) 0q ttR q > and 
''
22 2
( ) 0q q tt tR q < . In return, the local community must provide a monitoring effort θ  of the protected 
forest at the cost ( )C θ with first and second positive derivatives, i.e., ' ( ) 0Cθ θ > and 
'' ( ) 0Cθθ θ > .  
1  All revenues throughout this article are considered net of exploitation cost. Only the monitoring 
cost is explicitly considered to emphasise relative importance in this setting, compared to tradi-
tional exploitation costs.
2  Wood residues represent 60 per cent  of the volume of timber harvested (Aifort, 2008).
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23The maximisation of this profit takes into account the dynamics of the forest 
resource. 2 2( )tg x is the natural growth of the unprotected forest, with the positive 
first derivative and negative second derivative, i.e., '2 2( ) 0tg x > and
''
2 2( ) 0tg x < . 
1 1( )tg x is the natural growth of the protected forest with a positive first derivative 
and the negative second derivative, i.e., '1 1( ) 0tg x > and
''
1 1( ) 0tg x < . Finally, 
1( , )tI x θ is the function of farmer infiltration that grows with the stock of protected 
forest and decreases with the level of effort θ . The properties of this infiltration 
function are as follows:
4.1.2  SODEFOR
The discounted profit for SODEFOR SODπ  is constituted of the sum of the 
remaining parts after the extraction of the local community, and is equal to 
1 1(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )t tR q R xα β− + − since 0 1α< < and 0 1β< < . It is possible to solve 
this problem by considering two cases: The market and the social planner. Indeed, 
forest resources are a public good which produces external effects that are not always 
taken into account by market mechanisms. This will help to control different aspects 
of forest resource management.
4.2 Market- based optimisation problems
According to this approach, it is possible to solve the optimisation programme of 
each economic agent (the local community and SODEFOR) independently.
4.2.1  Local community’s optimisation programme
For the local community, it is a question of maximising over an infinite time horizon, 
the flux of net revenue from forest preservation and agricultural activities by taking 
into account the dynamic of the resource. Therefore, the optimisation programme of 
the local community is:
Where te δ− is a discount factor and δ a discount rate.
1 1 2( , ) 02
1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]                              (1)
/
( ) ( , )                                                                     (2)
( )
cl t
t t tq t
t t t t
t t t
Max R q R x R q C e dt
s c
x g x q I x
x g x q
δ
θ
π α β θ
θ
∞




                                                                                     (3)
' ' '' '' ''
1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1
''
1
(0, ) 0, ( , ) 0, ( , ) 0, ( , ) 0, ( , ) 0, ( , ) 0,  and
 ( , ) 0
x x x x xt t t t tt t t t t
t




θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ
= > < > < <
>
12 9
Community-based forest management in Côte d’Ivoire: A theoretical investigation
4.2.2  SODEFOR’s optimisation programme
For this structure, it is a question of maximising over an infinite time horizon, 
the incomes from its main and secondary activities, while taking into account the 
dynamics of the resource – especially the infiltration phenomenon.
Where te δ− is a discount factor and δ a discount rate.
4.3 Social planner’s optimisation problem
From the optimisation problems above, the public good effect of forests (externality) 
is not taken into account. To correct this market failure, the social planner maximises 
the discounted value of forest and agricultural profits, taking into account the nuisance 
costs and the public good effect of forests, 1( )tB x  by choosing 1tx , 2tx  and θ subject 
to the dynamics of the stock of forest and agricultural land. 1( )tB x captures the 
value of the forest to the general public in the form of its contribution to biodiversity, 
option value and existence value. We would expect that ' 11(0) 0, ( ) 0x ttB B x= >  and ''
11 1
( ) 0x x tt tB x < for a stock of forest that is regarded as a public good.
24Contrary to the market logic, the social planner takes into account externalities 
due to the ‘public property characteristic’ of the forest and the nuisance generated 
by the presence of the protected forest in terms of limitations on the expansion of 
agricultural activity on the part of the local community. The question facing the 
social planner is whether to maximise, over time, the social profit of the different 
actors (local community and SODEFOR) by taking into account the public good 
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The different optimisation programmes will be solved using Pontryagin’s maximum 
principles. Here, market-based solutions are differentiated from the social planner’s 
solution.
5.1 Market-based solutions
In this sub-section, the private decision-making process (market-based resource use 
situation) is outlined in which the agents (SODEFOR and the local community) do 
not take into account the externalities of forest conservation. Under consideration is 
a resource use regime where the agents share profits. The problems are solved using 
Pontryagin’s maximum principles.
Solution to SODEFOR’s problem
SODEFOR maximises equation (4) subject to equation (2). Thus, the current value 
Hamiltonian (H c) is formulated as follows:
 
When we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary 
conditions from equations (6) to (8):
                                      
                                                             
           
Assuming the steady state where  , the co-state equation yields
 
                                                                                                
Considering equation (13), we get
                                                                                  
In an equilibrium case with main and secondary activities we have
                                                                                             
𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 = [(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅(𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡)] + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡(𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃))
  l  tryagin’s maximum principles, we get the foll wing ecessary conditions 
from equations (6) to (8):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′                                       (6) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                              (7) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 ⟺ (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡          (8)  
 Assuming the steady state where 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ = 0, the co-state equation yields
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
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′ = 𝛿𝛿 − (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. ))                                                                                             (8c)
Solution to the local community’s problem
The local community maximises equation (1) subject to equations (2) and (3). Thus, the 
current value Hamiltonian (𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐) is formulated as follows:
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ( , )) ( ( ) )
c
t t t t t t t t t tH R q R x R q C g x q I x g x qα β θ µ θ µ= + + − + − − + −  
When we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (9) to (14):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 ⟺−𝐶𝐶′(𝜃𝜃) − 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝜕𝜕′ = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 =
𝐶𝐶′(𝜕𝜕)
−𝐼𝐼𝜃𝜃
′                                                       (9)       
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′                                                                 (10)    
𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 = [(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅(𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡)] + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡(𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃))
When we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (6) to (8):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′                                       (6) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                              (7) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 ⟺ (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡          (8)  
 Assuming the steady state where 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ = 0, the co-state equation yields
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡







                                                                                                (8a)








                                                                                  (8b)




′ = 𝛿𝛿 − (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. ))                                                                                             (8c)
Solution to the local community’s problem
The local community maximises equation (1) subject to equations (2) and (3). Thus, the 
current value Hamiltonian (𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐) is formulated as follows:
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ( , )) ( ( ) )
c
t t t t t t t t t tH R q R x R q C g x q I x g x qα β θ µ θ µ= + + − + − − + −  
When we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (9) to (14):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 ⟺−𝐶𝐶′(𝜃𝜃) − 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝜕𝜕′ = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 =
𝐶𝐶′(𝜕𝜕)
−𝐼𝐼𝜃𝜃
′                                                       (9)       
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′                                                                 (10)    
𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 = [(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅(𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡)] + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡(𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃))
hen we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (6) to (8):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
= 0 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = 0 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′                                       (6) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                              (7) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡          (8)  
 Assuming the steady state where 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ = 0, the co-state equation yields
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡






                                                                                                (8a)







                                                                                  (8b)




′ = 𝛿𝛿 − (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. ))                                                                                             (8c)
Solution to the local community’s problem
The local community maximises equation (1) subject to equations (2) and (3). Thus, the 
current value Hamiltonian (𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐) is formulated as follows:
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ( , )) ( ( ) )
c
t t t t t t t t t tH R q R x R q C g x q I x g x qα β θ µ θ µ= + + − + − − + −  
hen we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (9) to (14):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 −𝐶𝐶′(𝜃𝜃) − 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝜕𝜕′ = 0 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 =
𝐶𝐶′(𝜕𝜕)
−𝐼𝐼𝜃𝜃




′ − 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 0 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′                                                                 (10)    
𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 [(1 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅(𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡) (1 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡)] 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡(𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃))
When e apply Pontryagin’s axi u  principles, e get the follo ing necessary conditions 
fro  equations (6) to (8):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
0 ⟺ (1 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′ 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 (1 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′                                       (6) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                              (7) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 ⟺ (1 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡          (8)  
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′ (. ))                                                                                             (8c)
Solution to the local co unity’s proble
The local co unity axi ises equation (1) subject to equations (2) and (3). Thus, the 
current value a iltonian (𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐) is for ulated as follo s:
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ( , )) ( ( ) )
c
t t t t t t t t t tR q R x R q C g x q I x g x qα β θ µ θ µ= + + − + − − + −  
When e apply Pontryagin’s axi u  principles, e get the follo ing necessary conditions 
fro  equations (9) to (14):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
0 ⟺ 𝐶𝐶′(𝜃𝜃) 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝜕𝜕′ 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐶′(𝜕𝜕)
−𝐼𝐼𝜃𝜃




′ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′                                                                 (10)    
𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 = [(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅(𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡)] + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡(𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃))
When we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (6) to (8):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′                                       (6) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                              (7) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 ⟺ (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡          (8)  
 Assuming the steady state where 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ = 0, the co-state equation yields
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡







                                                                                                (8a)








                                                                                  (8b)




′ = 𝛿𝛿 − (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. ))                                                                                             (8c)
Solution to the local community’s problem
The local community maximises equation (1) subject to equations (2) and (3). Thus, the 
current value Hamiltonian (𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐) is formulated as follows:
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ( , )) ( ( ) )
c
t t t t t t t t t tH R q R x R q C g x q I x g x qα β θ µ θ µ= + + − + − − + −  
When we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (9) to (14):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 ⟺−𝐶𝐶′(𝜃𝜃) − 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝜕𝜕′ = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 =
𝐶𝐶′(𝜕𝜕)
−𝐼𝐼𝜃𝜃
′                                                       (9)       
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′                                                                 (10)    
𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 = [(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅(𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡)] + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡(𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃))
When we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (6) to (8):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′                                       (6) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                              (7) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 ⟺ (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡          (8)  
 Assuming the steady state where 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ = 0, the co-state equation yields
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡







                                                                                                (8a)
Considering equation (13), we get
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′ = 𝛿𝛿 − (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. ))                                                                                             (8c)
Solution to the local community’s problem
The local co munity maxi ises equation (1) subject to equations (2) and (3). Thus, the 
current value Hamiltonian (𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐) is formulated as follows:
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ( , )) ( ( ) )
c
t t t t t t t t t tH R q R x R q C g x q I x g x qα β θ µ θ µ= + + − + − − + −  
Whe  we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (9) to (14):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 ⟺−𝐶𝐶′(𝜃𝜃) − 𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝜕𝜕′ = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 =
𝐶𝐶′(𝜕𝜕)
−𝐼𝐼𝜃𝜃
′                                                       (9)       
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′                                                                 (10)    
12 11
Community-based forest management in Côte d’Ivoire: A theoretical investigation
 Solution to the local community’s problem
The local community maximises equation (1) subject to equations (2) and (3). Thus, 
the current value Hamiltonian (     ) is formulated as follows:
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ( , )) ( ( ) )
c
t t t t t t t t t tH R q R x R q C g x q I x g x qα β θ µ θ µ= + + − + − − + −
When we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary 
conditions from equations (9) to (14):
                                                             
                                                                
                 
                                                  
Rewriting equation (9), we get '1( ) tC Iθθ µ′ = −                                                (9a)
Assuming the steady state solution where 1 2 0t tµ µ= =  and an interior solution, the 
co-state equations yield
                                                        
Considering equation (9), we have
                                                                
If we also consider equation (8c), we get
                                                                                       
From equation (12), when we assume the steady state, we get
                                                                                       
The results derived from the maximisation problems of these agents are analysed 
according to the agriculture vs. forest conflict and welfare implications. Two 
𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 = [(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅(𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡)] + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡(𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃))
When we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (6) to (8):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′                                       (6) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                              (7) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 ⟺ (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡          (8)  
 Assuming the steady state where 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ = 0, the co-state equation yields
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡







                                                                                                (8a)








                                                                                  (8b)




′ = 𝛿𝛿 − (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. ))                                                                                             (8c)
Solution to the local community’s problem
The local community maximises equation (1) subject to equations (2) and (3). Thus, the 
current value Hamiltonian (𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐) is formulated as follows:
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ( , )) ( ( ) )
c
t t t t t t t t t tH R q R x R q C g x q I x g x qα β θ µ θ µ= + + − + − − + −  
When we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (9) to (14):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 ⟺−𝐶𝐶′(𝜃𝜃) − 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝜕𝜕′ = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 =
𝐶𝐶′(𝜕𝜕)
−𝐼𝐼𝜃𝜃
′                                                       (9)       
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′                                                                 (10)    
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 ⟺ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔1𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡                 (11) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 ⟺ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔2𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
′ = −𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡                                                      (12) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                          (13) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔2(𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇                                                                               (14)
iting equation (9), we get '1( ) tC Iθθ µ′ = −                                                                   (9a) 








                                                                                                      (11a)  









′                                                                                            (11b)





                                                                                                     (11c)
 
From equation (12), when we assume the steady state, we get
𝑔𝑔2,𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
′ = 𝛿𝛿                                                                                                                            (12a) 
The results derived from the maximisation problems of these agents are analysed according 
to the agriculture vs. forest conflict and welfare implications. Two resource use regimes are 
considered here: The joint management case, where the local community gets fixed shares of 
the profit from secondary activities and logging (sale of forest concession permits); and a
situation where the local community does not reap any benefits from the forest (no joint 
management case).
5.1.1 Joint management case where 0, 0β α≠ ≠  
Equations (6) to (14) give the necessary conditions3 for the forest authority (SODEFOR) and 
local community maximisation problems. From these equations, we note that the local 
                                                           
3 First-order conditions are also sufficient for optimality, since all functions are concaves and the co-state 
variables are all positives.
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 ⟺ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔1𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡                 (11) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 ⟺ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔2𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
′ = −𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡                                                      (12) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                          (13) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔2(𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇                                                                               (14)
Rewriting equation (9), we get '1( ) tC Iθθ µ′ = −                                                                   (9a) 








                                                                                                      (11a)  









′                                                                                            (11b)





                                                                                                     (11c)
 
From equation (12), when we assume the steady state, we get
𝑔𝑔2,𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
′ = 𝛿𝛿                                                                                                                            (12a) 
The results derived from the maximisation problems of these agents are analysed according 
to the agriculture vs. forest conflict and welfare implications. Two resource use regimes are 
considered here: The joint management case, where the local community gets fixed shares of 
the profit from secondary activities and logging (sale of forest concession permits); and a
situation where the local community does not reap any benefits from the forest (no joint 
management case).
5.1.1 Joint management case where 0, 0β α≠ ≠  
Equations (6) to (14) give the necessary conditions3 for the forest authority (SODEFOR) and 
local community maximisation problems. From these equations, we note that the local 
                                                           
3 First-order conditions are also sufficient for optimality, since all functions are concaves and the co-state 
variables are all positives.
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔1𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡                 (11) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔2𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
′ = −𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡                                                      (12) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                          (13) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇ 𝑔𝑔2(𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇                                                                               (14)
Rewriting equation (9), we get '1( ) tC Iθθ µ′ = −                                                                   (9a) 








                                                                                                      (11a)  









′                                                                                            (11b)





                                                                                                     (11c)
 
From equation (12), when we assume the steady state, we get
𝑔𝑔2,𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
′ = 𝛿𝛿                                                                                                                      (12a) 
The results derived from the maximisation problems of these agents are analysed according 
to the agriculture vs. forest conflict and welfare implications. Two resource use regimes are 
considered here: The joint management case, where the local community gets fixed shares of 
the profit from secondary activities and logging (sale of forest concession permits); and a
situation where the local community does not reap any benefits from the forest (no joint 
management case).
5.1.1 Joint management case where 0, 0β α≠ ≠  
Equations (6) to (14) give the necessary conditions3 for the forest authority (SODEFOR) and 
local community maximisation problems. From these equations, we note that the local 
                                                           
3 First-order conditions are also sufficient for optimality, since all functions are concaves and the co-state 
variables are all positives.
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡̇ 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 ⟺ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔1𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡̇ 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡                 (11) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡̇ 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 ⟺ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔2𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
′ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡̇ 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡                                                      (12) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                          (13) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔2(𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡) 𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇                                                                               (14)
e riting equation (9), e get '1( ) t Iθθ′                                                                   (9a) 








                                                                                                      (11a)  








′                                                                                            (11b)





                                                                                                     (11c)
 
ro  equation (12), hen e assu e the steady state, e get
𝑔𝑔2,𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
′ 𝛿𝛿                                                                                                                            (12a) 
he results derived fro  the axi isation proble s of these agents are analysed according 
to the agriculture vs. forest conflict and elfare i plications. o resource use regi es are 
considered here: he joint anage ent case, here the local co unity gets fixed shares of 
the profit fro  secondary activities and logging (sale of forest concession per its); and a
situation here the local co unity does not reap any benefits fro  the forest (no joint 
anage ent case).
5.1.1 Joi t a age e t case ere 0, 0  
quations (6) to (14) give the necessary conditions3 for the forest authority ( ) and 
local co unity axi isation proble s. ro  these equations, e note that the local 
                                                           
3 First-order conditions are also sufficient for opti ality, since all functions are concaves and the co-state 
variables are all positives.
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 ⟺ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔1𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡                 (11) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 ⟺ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔2𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
′ = −𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡                                                      (12) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                          (13) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔2(𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇                                                                               (14)
Rewriting equation (9), we get '1( ) tC Iθθ µ′ = −                                                                   (9a) 
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                                                                                                     (11c)
 
From equation (12), when we assume the steady state, we get
𝑔𝑔2,𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
′ = 𝛿𝛿                                                                                                                            (12a) 
The results derived from the maximisation problems of these agents are analysed ccording 
to the agriculture vs. forest conflict and welfare implications. Two resource use regimes are 
considered here: The join  man ge ent case, wh re the local community gets fixed shares of
he profit from secondary activities and logging (sale of forest concession permits); and a
situation w  the local community does not reap any benefits from the forest (no joint
management case).
5.1.1 Joint management case where 0, 0β α≠ ≠  
Equations (6) to (14) give the necessary conditions3 for the forest authority (SODEFOR) and 
local community maximisation problems. From these equations, we note that the local 
                                                         
3 First-order conditions are also sufficient for optimality, since all functions are concaves and the co-state 
variables are all positives.
𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 = [(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅(𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡)] + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡(𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃))
When we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get he following necessary conditions 
fro  equatio s (6) to (8):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′                                       (6) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                              (7) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 ⟺ (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡          (8)  
 Assuming the steady state where 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡̇ = 0, the co-state equation yields
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇3𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡







                                                                                                (8a)
Considering equation (13), we get






                                                                                (8b)




′ = 𝛿𝛿 − (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. ))                                                                                             (8c)
Solution to the local community’s problem
Th local community maximises equation (1) subject to equations (2) and (3). Thus, the 
current value Hamiltonian (𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐) is formulated as follows:
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ( , )) ( ( ) )
c
t t t t t t t t t tH R q R x R q C g x q I x g x qα β θ µ θ µ= + + − + − − + −  
When we appl  Pontryagin’s maximum principles, we get the following necessary conditions 
from equations (9) to (14):
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 ⟺−𝐶𝐶′(𝜃𝜃) − 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝜕𝜕′ = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡 =
𝐶𝐶′(𝜕𝜕)
−𝐼𝐼𝜃𝜃
′                                                       (9)       
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′                                                               (10)    
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resource use regimes are considered here: The joint management case, where the 
local community gets fixed shares of the profit from secondary activities and logging 
(sale of forest concession permits); and a situation where the local community does 
not reap any benefits from the forest (no joint management case).
5.1.1  Joint management case where 0, 0β α≠ ≠
Equations (6) to (14) give the necessary conditions3 for the forest authority 
(SODEFOR) and local community maximisation problems. From these equations, 
we note that the local community has its own valuation of the forest, which differs 
from the valuation of the forest authority. 
34Condition (9a) shows that the local community will apply anti-infiltration efforts 
up to a level at which the marginal cost of such efforts is equal to their marginal 
benefit. The marginal benefit consists of the value of the forest saved from infiltration 
as a result of anti-infiltration efforts and is evaluated at the current shadow price of 
the forest resource. The shadow value of the forest, from the point of view of the 
local community, is strictly positive since ' '1, 1 1 1 1( ( ( ) ( , )))x t t x t tg x I xδ θ− − (equation 
8c) is positive. From equation (11a) we note that the larger the β, the higher the 
value attributed to the forest resource by the local community. Likewise, from 
equation (11c) the local community’s shadow value of the forest is positively related 
to β  and negatively related toα . It comes from equations (9 and 11c) or 11b that 
the level of the anti-infiltration effort and the share of revenue β  accruing to the 
local community are positively related. Thus, β  is nothing other than the level of 
incentive provided to the local community to exert an anti-infiltration effort aimed 
at forest preservation. β can also be seen as the degree of integration (implication) of 
the local community in the joint management project.  
35In addition, the forest authority obviously has a positive existence value as a 
forest resource, as shown in equation (6). But, this value decreases with α. Thus, 
the higher the share of revenue from secondary activity, the higher the level of anti-
infiltration effort. The optimal (highest) anti-infiltration effort is obtained when β  
is close to unity while α is close to zero. This will give incentives to both the local 
community and SODEFOR, to conserve the forest.
36In equilibrium with main and secondary activities, equation (8c) states that the 
sum of relative marginal value of forest exploitation activities and forest capital gain 
should be equal to the social opportunity cost when taking into account revenue 
sharing. Otherwise, equation (8c) implies that the marginal natural growth of the 
forest net of infiltration is slower than the discount rate, as the secondary activity is 
relatively more valuable than the main one. These two variables are growing almost 
at the same rate when the converse is applied, that is, when the main activity is more 
valuable than the second. This shows that the rate of time preference is mitigated and 
grows at the same rate as the marginal natural growth of forest net of infiltration, to 
3  First-order conditions are also sufficient for optimality, since all functions are concaves and the 
co-state variables are all positives.
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the extent that SODEFOR’s main activity is relatively more valuable than the second. 
This is desirable for environmental purposes, especially for forest conservation. The 
more the main activity is relatively valuable, the more forest conservation will be 
implemented. At a given value of ' 1 1( )x t tR x and ' 1 1( )q t tR q , the conservation of the 
forest will be better if β  is close to unity, whileα is close to 0. Globally, the joint 
management of forest resources is sustainable if ' '1 1 1 1( ) ( )q t t x t tR q R x≥ and β α≥ . 
It comes from these considerations that the forest resource exploitation will be 
sustainable only if the social discount rate does not exceed the marginal natural 
growth of the forest net of infiltration. 
37Equation (8) shows that the stock of forest will be expanded by the forest 
authority up to the point where the marginal cost of that expansion is equal to its 
marginal benefit. Indeed, an increase in the stock of forest generates the benefits of 
expansion: additional secondary revenue, increase in the value of the forest resource, 
and the stock effect. The opportunity cost of forest conservation is the foregone net 
proceeds from the sale of forest products (timber) if the forest is not conserved, 
and an additional level of forest that has been saved with forest conservation. This 
opportunity cost is evaluated at the shadow price of the forest resource.
38Equation (11) solves for the optimal stock of forest to be conserved *1
JM
tx  4 given 
the value of θ*JM derived from the local community’s optimisation programme. 
Indeed, from equation (11c) we can get 1tµ given β  andα . Then, from equation (9), 
we get θ*JM. The optimal stock of non-protected forest land *2
JM
tx  is obtained from 
equation (12a). Indeed, according to equation (12), the local community will expand 
its agricultural surface until the marginal cost is equal the marginal benefit. The 
marginal benefit of non-protected forest land conservation consists of the stock effect 
that comes with an increase in the stock of agricultural land and the increase in the 
value of agriculture. The opportunity cost of conservation of non-protected land is 
the foregone interest receipt on proceeds from the sale of agricultural products that 
would have been realised if non-protected forest land were converted to agriculture. 
This opportunity cost is evaluated at the shadow price of non-protected forest land.
39The local community has a positive valuation of the non-protected forest land, 
as shown in equation (10). Equation (12a) shows that the non-protected forest land 
must grow at the discount rate δ which is the opportunity cost of conservation of 
non-protected forest land. 














tx  and θ*JM assuming steady state.
41The welfare of the local community is indicated by its profits derived from 
agriculture and forest conservation ( 1 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t tR q R x R q Cα β θ+ + − ) and, for 
SODEFOR by profits from forest conservation ( 1 1(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )t tR q R xα β− + − ). 
Thus, the optimal stock of forest is supposed to be greater in this case than another 
where there is no joint management arrangement. Indeed, they do more forest 
conservation since they reap some benefits from forest conservation activities.
4 JM stands for joint management. 
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5.1.2 Discussion aboutα and β
With α β= , the forest authority’s incentive for forest conservation has not been 
changed compared to the one under the state management regime (see equation 8c). 
In contrast to that result, the local community’s incentive for forest conservation 
is high (see equations 11c, 9 and the welfare expression) in this joint management 
regime. Under joint management policy, the optimal stock of forest increases when
α β< . 
42From the welfare expression, we note that SODEFOR and the local community 
have more conservation incentives, with profit derived from secondary activity. 
Thus, the optimal stock of forest (more conservation) would show more significant 
increases under the joint management regime than before. The local community 
does more forest conservation (monitoring) activity than agricultural activity.
5.1.3  No joint management case where α=β=0
Considering the state management situation where α=β=0, condition (11b) will 
only be satisfied with an optimal anti-infiltration effort of zero. Thus, the local 
community applies no anti-infiltration effort in that regime, i.e., * 0NJθ =  . In this 
context, protected forest will disappear as long as it has zero existence value for the 
local community, according to equation (11a).  Indeed, the local community does 
not care about forest conservation in that case, since its welfare 2( ) ( )tR q C θ−  
is not dependent on the forest as a resource. There are no incentives for the local 
community to exert any conservation activities. In the same way as previously 














tx  and θ*NJ by 
setting α=β=0.
5.1.4  Comparison of the two cases and policy implications
Under the joint management regime, the local community derives additional profit 
from forest resource use. Under joint management the optimal anti-infiltration effort 
is positive, as shown by conditions (11a) and (9). Thus, the local community has a 
greater incentive to monitor the protected forest. The higher the share of revenue 
from secondary activity, the greater the anti-infiltration effort on the part of the 
local community. The non-zero effort level of θ*JM (θ*JM > (θ*NJ=0)) gives room for 
designing JMP aimed at enlisting the support of the local community in forest 
preservation, through the use of economic incentives (Fernandez-Puente, 1996). It 
must be the case that when community-based forest conservation schemes are put in 
place, they are structured so as to sufficiently reward the local community to exert 
anti-infiltration effort. Thus, the local community should be adequately rewarded in 
order to attain its cooperation in forest conservation (Nguinguiri, 1999). The highest 
optimal anti-infiltration effort is obtained when β  is close to unity.
43Local community cooperation in forest conservation is mainly aimed at reducing 
the level of infiltration and enhancing the stock of forest. Thus, the impact of 
anti-infiltration effort * *JM NJθ θ> under joint management will result in more 
5
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conservation, i.e., * *1 1
JM NJ
t tx x> . In that case, the local community performs more 
forest conservation activities than agricultural activities * *2 2
NJ JM
t tq q> . This result 
makes room for the implementation of forestry community programmes where 
the forest management is entrusted to the local community. In addition, the non-
zero share 1 β−  (see equation 11c) going to the forestry authority can be seen 
as supporting this structure in carrying out training programmes (fire protection, 
greenbelt establishment, etc.) and extra extension services to strengthen the local 
community’s ability to sustainably manage the forest. Indeed, the local community’s 
conservation activities should be regulated by the forestry authority, and should 
assist it in its management plan design.
5.2 The solution to the social planner problem
We solve the social planner’s problem using Pontryagin’s maximum principles.
Considering the current value Hamiltonian, we have
                                  
                                                 
                                                         
                                                           
                                                      
                                                                 
   
( )
1 1 2 1( , , )1 02
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  
                            (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )]                                5
/
( ) ( , )                    
Social
t t t tq qt t
t
t t
t t t t
Max R q R x R q B x C
R q R x e dt
s c
x g x q I x
θ
δ





= + + + − +∫
− + −
= − − ( )
( )2 2 2 2
                                                  2
( )                                                                                      3t t tx g x q= −
1 1 2 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1 5 2 2 2
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )]
( ( ) ( , )) ( ( ) )
c
t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
H R q R x R q B x C R q R x
g x q I x g x q
α β θ α β
µ θ µ
= + + + − + − + − +
− − + −
( )
1 1 2 1( , , )1 02
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  
                            (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )]                                5
/
( ) ( , )                    
Social
t t t tq qt t
t
t t
t t t t
Max R q R x R q B x C
R q R x e dt
s c
x g x q I x
θ
δ





= + + + − +∫
− + −
= − − ( )
( )2 2 2 2
          2
( )                                              3t t tx g x q= −
 
Considering the current value Hamiltonian, we have
1 2 1 1 1
5 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )]
, )) ( ( ) )
t t t t t
t t t t t t t
B x C R q R x
g x q





= 0 ⟺−𝐶𝐶′(𝜃𝜃) − 𝜇𝜇4𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝜕𝜕′ = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇4𝑡𝑡 =
𝐶𝐶′(𝜕𝜕)
−𝐼𝐼𝜃𝜃
′                                                 (15) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇5𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇5𝑡𝑡 ⟺ 𝜇𝜇5𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔2𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡
′ = −𝜇𝜇5𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇5𝑡𝑡                                                 (16) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
= 0 ⟺ 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇4𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇4𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡




= 0 ⟺ 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝜇𝜇5𝑡𝑡 = 0 ⟹ 𝜇𝜇5𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡
′                                                            (18) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇4𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔1(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡̇                                                       (19) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇5𝑡𝑡
= 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇ ⟺ 𝑔𝑔2(𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡̇                                                                           (20) 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
= −𝜇𝜇4𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇4𝑡𝑡 ⟺ 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ + 𝜇𝜇4𝑡𝑡 �𝑔𝑔1𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ − 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
′ (. )� = −𝜇𝜇4𝑡𝑡̇ + 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇4𝑡𝑡   (21) 
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                                                                                       (21b)
Considering steady state solution, equations (15) and (21) lead to
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𝐶𝐶′ 𝜃𝜃 𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝜕𝜕′ 𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐶′(𝜕𝜕)
𝐼𝐼𝜃𝜃
′                                                  
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡
𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡̇ 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡




′ 𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞 𝑡𝑡





′ 𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞 𝑡𝑡
′                                                             
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡̇ 𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡 𝑞𝑞 𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼 𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃 𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡̇                                                        
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡̇ 𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡 𝑞𝑞 𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡̇                                                                            
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡
𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡̇ 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡
′ 𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡
′ 𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡 𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡
′ 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡
′ . 𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡̇ 𝛿𝛿𝜇𝜇 𝑡𝑡    
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Considering equations (17) and (15) we get
                                                                                                                        
Considering the steady state where 4 5 0t tµ µ= =  equation (21) leads to 
                                                                                                      
Considering equations (21) and (17) we get
                                                                                     
Considering steady state solution, equations (15) and (21) lead to 
                                                                                             
From equation (16) assuming steady state where 5 0tµ =  we get
                                                                                                                               
The necessary conditions for maximising the social planer problem are reduced to 
equations 15–23. From equations (15) and (21) we can get θ*s 5 and *1
S
tx  considering 
equation (17) and assuming steady state. Equations (16) and (20) solve for *2
S
tx
assuming steady state. *1
S




tq  are obtained from equations (19) and (20) 
assuming steady state.
44Condition (21c) implies that the anti-infiltration effort of the social planner is 
positive and greater than the levels obtained previously in the two market-based 
regimes, i.e., θ*S> θ*JM> θ*NJ. In addition, the social planner has a positive valuation 
of the protected forest which is greater than those of the local community and 
SODEFOR, as long as 1( )tB x′ >0. This high level of forest resource valuation 
requires a high level of effort from the local community, as depicted in equations 
(21a) and (21c). Therefore, the social planner solution requires a higher effort level 
than other two market solution regimes. The social planner’s optimal solution shows 
a greater anti-infiltration effort and an extra term 1( )tB x′  (the marginal public good 
effect) compared to the market-based solution. Thus, the socially optimal stock of 
forest would be greater than the joint management market situation level. 
45In this perspective, social welfare would improve if a financial reward is designed 
that fully compensates the effort of the local community. All these results are 
summarised in Table 1, where the effort level and welfare scenarios are presented 
according to internal and external economic incentives.  
5  S stands for social planner solution.
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Considering the current value Hamiltonian, we have
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From equation (16) assuming steady state where 5 0tµ = we get
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The necessary conditions for maximising the social planer problem are reduced to equations 
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tq are obtained from equations (19) and (20) assuming steady state.
Condition (21c) implies that the anti-infiltration effort of the social planner is positive 
and greater than the levels obtained previously in the two market-based regimes, i.e., θ*S>
θ*JM> θ*NJ. In addition, the social planner has a positiv  valuation of th  protected forest 
which is greater than those of the local community and SODEFOR, as long as 1( )tB x′ >0. 
This high level of forest resource valuation requires a high level of effort from the local 
community, as depicted in equations (21a) and (21c). Therefore, the social planner solution 
requires a higher effort level than other two m rket solution regimes. The social planner’s 
optimal solution shows a greater anti-infiltration effort and an extra term 1( )tB x′ (the marginal 
public good effect) compared to the market-based solution. Thus, the socially optimal stock 
of forest would be greater than the joint management market situation level.
In this perspective, social welfare would improve if a financial reward is designed that 
fully compensates the effort of the local community. All these results are summarised in 
Table 1, where the effort level and welfare scenarios are presented according to internal and 
external economic incentives. 
Table 1: Economic incentives, effort level and social welfare scenarios
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6 S stands for social planner solution. 
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Table 1: Economic incentives, effort level and social welfare scenarios
                            β tends to
       α tends to
0 1
0
without external financial sup-
port S
1 : no effort S
2: effort level with little 
welfare improvement
with external financial support S1’ : no effort S
2’: highest effort level 
with welfare improvement
1 without external financial sup-
port
S3: no effort but 
welfare improve-
ment
S4: effort level with more 
welfare improvement
with external financial support
S3’: no effort but 
welfare improve-
ment
S4’: greater effort level 
with more welfare im-
provement
Source: author
Scenarios S1 and S1’ describe the situation of current forest management where there 
are no incentives and there is no welfare improvement. S2 describes the situation 
where more incentives are provided to the local community to apply more effort in 
conserving the forest. But, the highest effort level is obtained when external financial 
support is considered, as in S2’. This scenario is best as far as joint management is 
concerned. In S3 and S3’ scenarios, no incentives are provided, but there is welfare 
improvement of the local community. These cases (especially S3’) illustrate the 
situation of ongoing joint forest management projects promoted by NGOs where 
some socioeconomic infrastructure is provided, but the forest is still under pressure. 
Scenario S4 provides fewer incentives compared to S2’ and S4’ but improves the 
welfare of the local community, and describes community forestry initiatives. In 
terms of welfare improvement, scenario S4’ with external funding is best. Globally, 
the level of effort is higher with external financial support. 
5.3 Economic policy measures
Policy measures follow from the adjustment of market solutions to the social 
planner’s solution. Considering the case where 1( ) 0tB x′ = , the adjustment requires 
that all profits from secondary activity should be given to the local community, 
that is, α tends to 0 and β  tends to 1. This result suggests that activities related 
to the exploitation of forest by-products (charcoal, rafters, planks, beams, etc.) 
should be managed by the local community (Fernandez-Puente, 1996) while the 
logging activity is undertaken by SODEFOR, but with the forest management 
plan jointly designed. This would bring about social optimality. However, when 
considering the public good effect of forest ( 1( ) 0tB x′ > ), the policy measure that 
will help save the protected forest is to increase the value of secondary activity. In 
this way, both SODEFOR and the local community have more incentives for forest 
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conservation. But, in relative terms, if SODEFOR’s main activity is more valuable 
than the secondary one, then conservation will improve as the time preference is 
mitigated. Thus, increasing the share of secondary activity profit going to the local 
community is expected to increase the stock of protected forest. In addition, in 
the context of global warming, where forests play an important role, the need for 
greater conservation requires financial contributions on the part of the international 
community, in the form of Pigouvian subsidy to the local community. The extra 
term 1( )tB x′ in this joint management justifies the external financial support for 
forest conservation. 
6 Conclusion
The persistence of peasant encroachment on protected forest has raised the main 
question of whether the joint management policy initiated by SODEFOR has been 
properly implemented. To this end, we formulated a bio-economic model with 
two agents (local community and SODEFOR) and two activities (agriculture and 
forest conservation) to analyse the JMP using dynamic optimisation techniques in 
continuous time. The study provided information that could be used to strengthen 
policies aimed at improving the level of forest conservation and helping the local 
community grow out of poverty.
46The main finding of this study is that JMP and equitable sharing of forest income 
to benefit the local community will improve the management of protected forests by 
mitigating the peasants’ encroachments. Indeed, the article investigated what policy 
could stimulate forest conservation. First, the results show that increasing the share 
of SODEFOR’s profit from its secondary activity going to the local community, and 
increasing the value of that activity, are expected to conserve the forest, since it 
will increase the stock of forest. Indeed, the highest optimal anti-infiltration effort 
supplied by the local community is obtained when that profit share is close to unity. 
Second, the study proposed that SODEFOR’s main activity should be relatively 
more valuable than the secondary one, as long as it mitigates the time preference. 
Third, the study also noted that the natural growth rate of non-protected forest must 
be equal to the discount rate (opportunity cost of capital). Lastly, the article revealed 
the need for international support to sufficiently account for the existence and option 
values of the forest (i.e., its public good effect).
47Globally, the article recommends the joint management initiative with profit 
sharing. This profit is related both to SODEFOR’s protected forest activity and 
the international community’s financial support. Beyond these recommendations, 
the results of this study allow room for the implementation of communal forest 
management policy, much as in Cameroon, the Gambia and Zimbabwe, where 
people living on communal land are given legal rights and technical assistance to 
sustainably manage their natural resources. Under this scheme, the local community 
uses profits derived from the exploitation of these resources for rural development, 
while at the same time contributing to forest conservation. Indeed, the government’s 
ownership right over the forest resource since the colonial period not only failed to 
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bring about better management, but has in fact contributed to the impoverishment 
of the rural population. In fact, with the full implication of local community, this 
approach constitutes an opportunity for income source diversification that limits the 
degree of vulnerability of the rural poor. Besides many shortcomings (such as lack of 
human, financial and material resources) of the former approach being solved by this 
participative approach, it can employ traditional knowledge and skills to improve 
the level of forest conservation. Therefore this new approach to forest management 
will help achieve the millennium development goals of reducing poverty in rural 
areas especially. 
48However, the effectiveness of these economic incentives depends on the 
reinforcement of the institutional framework within the international context of 
institutional decentralisation and democratisation.    
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